India in a Double Squeeze: Two Chokepoints, One Crisis
Anjali Gupta & Dr Archana Gupta
Imagine the insecurity around which the two maritime chokepoints are transforming from a geographical constraint into an active theatre of geopolitical competition.
The current geopolitical dynamics have led to the development of a threat on the Bab el Mandeb strait following the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. With effective support from Iran to the Houthis, the threat becomes even more real if Iran suppresses its demands. Along with the crisis, for a certain period, the UAE can diversify its oil trade from the Strait of Hormuz through Bab el Mandeb via the East-West Pipeline. If Hormuz is closed, India cannot simply say, “We will buy more Saudi, Iraqi, Kuwaiti or Qatari oil. ” This is because much of that supply depends on Gulf export infrastructure and maritime access through Hormuz.
There are alternatives—Saudi Arabia and the UAE have bypass pipelines and alternative export arrangements—but their capacity is limited compared with normal Hormuz flows. EIA estimates that Saudi and UAE pipelines together could bypass roughly 4.7 million barrels/day, compared with more than 20 million barrels/day normally passing through Hormuz.
Even if Saudi tries to compensate its exports by redirecting them through the Red Sea, this creates another problem, because Bab el-Mandeb is closed (hypothetically). So now, if the alternative route is compromised.
The threat of disruption creates a web of fear encompassing maritime insecurity, causing trade route and shipping diversions and increasing transportation costs. Now this web is not only limited to affecting the economy, but it has strategic implications that hamper naval intervention, causing excessive militarisation transforming in geopolitical competition. Talking about its impact, it is more likely to create an energy security crisis through increased costs, delayed supplies, disrupted refinery logistics, and pressure on petroleum products, particularly if the closure remains prolonged.
Some will argue, why connect both routes? Chokepoints do not always operate independently; they are interdependent. That is what we refer to as chokepoint interdependence.
The geographical placement of Bab el-Mandeb connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea. It also links maritime routes from Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Suez Canal and European markets.
So, the problem is simply not the blockade of Bab el-Mandeb hampers Indian energy imports, but if Bab el-Mandeb is blocked, the existing maritime routes become longer, more expensive and less predictable, inducing a rapid rise in energy-import costs.
Now the question rises, it is only oil? No, India’s Oil imports can be diversified, and dependence and resilience on oil can be significantly decreased by adopting sustainable measures or various others, but the major strike is on LPG; of around 60%, LPG imports, 90% of which comes from the Strait of Hormuz. We not only need to work on our vulnerability, but we need to diversify our options and choices of energy dependence.
The Bab el-Mandeb blockade can convert India’s energy security from a problem of physical availability and cost rerouting into a problem of economic affordability, logistical reliability and strategic vulnerability.
Let us understand what its effect is if Bab el-Mandeb is blocked:
- Maritime: created shipping disruption and rerouting
- Energy: Higher crude/fuel costs an delayed supplies
- Strategic: Inflation, trade deficit, currency pressure and energy-security stress
Bab el-Mandeb is not dangerous to India merely because India depends on the chokepoint for a particular percentage of its energy supplies. Its strategic significance lies in its ability to transmit a localised maritime disruption into a broader energy-economic shock. It signals towards network effects with the closure of both gates, i.e., the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, simultaneously.
Therefore, disruption of the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb together does not necessarily mean India runs out crude. Instead, India can shift towards Russia, Latin America, West Africa, the United States of America and other non-Gulf suppliers.
Now, this even creates another problem of competition: competition for alternative barrels – who secures first and at what cost?
Because this is not only about India, the game involves other big players like China, Japan, South Korea, and other Asian importers, who are also in search of replacement supplies. For once, we can deal with the oil shock, but LPG becomes particularly important. This scenario becomes even more interesting and intense when we move beyond crude oil.
India’s LPG vulnerability is substantial. In 2025, India imported about 21.85 million tonnes of LPG, with roughly 90% of those imports coming from the Middle East; imports represented about 66% of consumption. Now consider: Hormuz disruption leads to Gulf LPG supply disruption. Bab el-Mandeb disruption means Red Sea alternative routes are disrupted. Therefore, LPG faces a double vulnerability. This could affect household cooking fuel, commercial LPG, restaurants, small industries, and transport-related LPG demand. India is already attempting to diversify LPG sourcing, including plans to source up to 25% of LPG imports from the United States in 2027.
You might be wondering, I have been all round discussing the potential threat. What happens if this becomes true? Now, the Cape of Good Hope becomes the emergency lifeline, crossing the Mozambique Channel. A major alternative maritime corridor which the world will be on the hunt for, but its capacity can simply not replace the dual vulnerability at an equivalent scale.
Anjali Gupta [PhD scholar in field of Indian Ocean Region, Department of Political Science & International Relations, IIS (Deemed to be University), Jaipur]
Dr. Archana Gupta [Associate Professor, Department of Political Science & International Relations, IIS (Deemed to be University), Jaipur]
