Riyadh and the Resistance: Shifting Middle Eastern Dynamics

By : Nirmalshankar M

How is the Israeli action and the Lebanese disarmament plan changing the tide of animosity into cooperation?

The speech of Hezbollah’s general secretary, Naim Qassem, who called for Saudi Arabia to open a new page in their relationship, was not expected. The probability of a Hezbollah-Saudi front against Israel is less likely due to decades-long animosity between the two, which is now a subject of contestation and renewed interest. Israel’s growing actions in Southern Lebanon and the Lebanese government’s plan to disarm Hezbollah suggest a possible shift in Middle Eastern geopolitics. The changing dynamics could make such an alignment, however unlikely, at least conceivable. 

The chasm between Saudi Arabia and Hezbollah is a core element of the broader Riyadh-Tehran rivalry in the region. Saudi Arabia is a Sunni-led Monarchy that views Iran (followers of Shia Islam) as its primary adversary. Meanwhile, Hezbollah is a proxy of Iran and is considered an instrument of Iranian influence, which primarily originates in Lebanon. This friction is not only ideological but strategic because, according to Riyadh, the Iran-backed Shiite group uses sectarianism and political maneuvering to advance its interests and undermine its influence. The Kingdom designated Hezbollah as a terrorist organisation in 2016 by citing its involvement in regional conflicts like the Syrian Civil War and its support of Houthis in Yemen, where both are affronts to Saudi interests.

For Saudi Arabia, Hezbollah’s political and military dominance in Lebanon has been a significant obstacle to its own influence in the country. Since Saudi Arabia’s involvement in ending Lebanon’s 15-year-long civil war in 1989 through the Taif Agreement, Riyadh invested millions of dollars to reconstruct the state and to counter Iranian influence. Until the assassination of the Kingdom’s loyalist Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005, Riyadh held a relative dominance. However, after 2005, Riyadh’s focus shifted towards its immediate neighbor, Yemen, allowing Tehran to widen its influence in Lebanon. For Saudi Arabia, a peaceful and prosperous Lebanon is only possible by disarming Hezbollah and bringing it under state control.

Hezbollah, on the other hand, views Riyadh as an ally of the United States and, at times, worked with Israel against the “Axis of Resistance” that includes Iran and other non-state actors. Qassem urged Saudi Arabia to establish a new relationship with the “Party of God” based on three principles: “dialogue to address concerns and resolve disputes”, “recognition of Israel as the enemy and not Hezbollah”, and “freezing past disagreements”. Qassem’s speech is a direct acknowledgement of this history and an attempt to reframe the conflict.

While the formal alliance is a distant prospect, recent incidents have created a set of new possibilities for a temporary and transactional relationship of interests between the two. The crucial factor is Israel’s escalating military actions, including its recent strike on Qatar. As a friendly neighbor, a US ally, and one of the mediators between Israel and Palestine, the attack became a serious turning point. The attack has been perceived by many, including Qassem, as a flagrant disregard for international law and a direct threat to the sovereignty of the Gulf Monarchies.

Consequently, the continued Israeli strike on Southern Lebanon, despite a ceasefire agreement, has sparked a sense of regional unity against Israel. The recent agreement between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signifies the scepticism of the Kingdom towards the USA’s reliability and to take real and tangible measures to deter further Israeli aggression. As such, in this new context, Arabs desire to contain Israel, and Hezbollah’s focus on fighting Israel seems a point of alignment, for now. Perhaps Qassem’s words, “pressure on the resistance only benefits Israel,” resonate more now than they would have a few years ago.

Despite these shifting dynamics, the hindrance to the Hezbollah-Saudi ties is exceptional. Firstly, the decades-long hostility and proxy conflicts in Lebanon have created an enormous distrust in Riyadh that is not easy to overcome. Saudi Arabia’s designation of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization reflects fundamental security concerns for its interests.

Secondly, the competing ideologies of both, where Riyadh seeks a stable Middle East under its leadership. Hezbollah, on the other hand, is a core part of Iran’s Axis of Resistance, committed to the policy of confronting the USA and Israel. These differences are unlikely to disappear despite sharing a common enemy.

Thirdly, Riyadh could not upset its security and economic partner, the USA, which is foundational to its foreign policy. The White House views Hezbollah as a terrorist organization and a potential threat to Middle Eastern stability. Any noticeable relation between Riyadh and Hezbollah would gravely jeopardize the Saudi-US relationship, a serious risk that is unlikely to be taken by Riyadh.

Fourthly, Naim Qassem’s recent speech signals the group’s vulnerability. The continuous conflict with Israel, followed by the increasing pressure to disarm, has severely weakened Hezbollah’s stature.

Although Qassem’s appeal to Saudi Arabia is monumental for regional diplomacy, the possibility of a full-fledged partnership is highly improbable. 

The author is a doctoral candidate at the Centre for West Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.